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Paolo G. Carozza and Daniel Philpott
The Catholic Church, Human 
Rights, and Democracy
Convergence and Conflict
with the Modern State
In Pope Benedict XVI’s address to the Roman Curia of December 
22, 2006, he made reference to the Catholic Church’s own journey 
toward embracing human rights and religious freedom.1 Perhaps 
surprisingly to some, he gave credit for this development to the En-
lightenment, which he said could count human rights and religious 
freedom as its “true conquests.” More predictably to most, he reit-
erated his longstanding criticism of the Enlightenment’s attempt to 
ground these principles on positivist and skeptical foundations. He 
argued rather that a constructive synergy of faith and reason was the 
best foundation for tolerance, human rights, and the preservation 
of religious freedom.
Benedict’s thesis points to an ambivalent historical relationship 
between the social teachings of the Catholic Church and modern 
political institutions based on human rights and democracy. It is in 
part a story of convergence. Gradually, over the course of the twen-
tieth century, then far more rapidly beginning with the Second Vati-
can Council, following upon several centuries of consistent resis-
tance to the momentum of European politics, the Church came to 
embrace norms of human rights and democracy reflective of those 
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that appeared in international instruments like the UN Charter and 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as the consti-
tutions of western democracies. As the term convergence—rather 
than accommodation or adaptation—suggests, the Church did not 
simply conform itself to what others had long before pioneered. 
True, as Benedict argues, a dialogue with the Enlightenment did 
beget Catholic evolution in certain dimensions of rights, especially 
religious freedom. But it is also the case, as we point out below, that 
the Church has articulated a tradition of rights since as early as the 
sixteenth century. For its own part, the state and the “international 
society” of states had to evolve, too. The sovereign states system 
signified by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 clearly evaded the ac-
countability that human rights and democracy demand. The French 
Revolution and its liberal republican legatees in Europe and Latin 
America propounded a portfolio of rights, to be sure, but with 
prominent lacunae, particularly in the case of the religious freedom 
of the Catholic Church. Indeed, the Church’s own willingness to 
embrace religious freedom at Vatican II arose in part from the as-
surance that post–World War II Western European democracies as 
well as the US Constitution provided that the Church could be free 
under a liberal democratic constitution. 
But the long rapprochement between the Church and modern 
norms of human rights and democracy is neither complete nor un-
contested. After Vatican II, tensions between the Church and mod-
ern states and international institutions did not disappear; ongoing 
clashes included the Church’s complex confrontation with authori-
tarian states and its fracases with democracies over abortion, di-
vorce, fetal research, euthanasia, war, and other issues, with the UN 
overpopulation policy, and with the European Union over Europe’s 
Christian identity and its policies on the family and sexuality. 
This article argues that the Catholic Church’s relationship to hu-
man rights and democracy in the modern world can only be under-
stood through both of the above dynamics: a historical convergence 
and the persistence of tension. The first half of the article argues for 
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this dual theme in the doctrines of the Church, where today, as over 
the past several centuries, the Catholic conception of the common 
good yields both an embrace of human rights and democracy and a 
critique of their secular espousal. The second half of the article fo-
cuses on practice, showing how the Church’s efforts to advance its 
teachings on human rights and democracy sometimes succeed and 
sometimes encounter resistance, both on account of conceptual dif-
ferences with modern states and international organizations as well 
as problems rooted in institutional realities. Doctrine and practice 
are not hermetically separable, but they are distinct enough for our 
analysis. Both realms, we argue, manifest historical convergence as 
well as ongoing ambivalence. 
I. Sovereignty, Human Rights, and Democracy in the Teaching  
of the Church
A systematic theoretical foundation for both international law and 
universal human rights emerged in Catholic thought at least as early 
as the sixteenth century in the work of Francisco de Vitoria and 
his contemporaries in Salamanca, Spain. The classical natural law 
account characteristic of the Catholic intellectual tradition has con-
sistently understood the paradigmatic definition of law to be tied to 
the good of the human person through law’s proper orientation to 
the common good.2 Out of his deep reflections on the Spanish en-
counter with the peoples of the New World, Vitoria expanded the 
Thomistic notion of the common good to incorporate into it the ius 
gentium, the law of nations. Vitoria analogized the whole world to a 
single commonwealth, in which all of the human family shares in a 
single common good.3 Synthesizing the juridical concepts of rights 
drawn from the canon law with the philosophical tradition of natu-
ral law, Vitoria and his followers also vigorously and systematically 
defended the rights of the American Indians to ownership of their 
lands, to equality, and to sovereignty, principally on the basis that 
the natural rights of the Indians were grounded in their creation 
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as rational beings in God’s image.4 The School of Salamanca thus 
represents an early and lucid example of Catholic human rights dis-
course. Confirmed by the papal magisterium in multiple instances, 
these doctrines regarding the unity of the human family and the 
rights of all of God’s children were not at all on the fringe of the 
teaching of the Church as a whole.5 
As these nascent ideas of international law and natural rights 
developed over the ensuing centuries, they differed in certain criti-
cal ways, in root and branch, from those notions of international 
legal order and human rights that came to dominate political and 
legal thought in the modern era. With respect to international law, 
the Westphalian system that emerged from the mid–seventeenth 
century onward was premised on the sovereignty of the territo-
rial state. This was understood by many to contradict the Catholic 
Church’s traditional teaching that political authority came “from 
God alone”6 (and indirectly, therefore, from the universal temporal 
authority of the Church itself). Pope Innocent X, for example, con-
demned the treaties of Westphalia as “null, void, invalid, iniquitous, 
unjust, damnable, reprobate, inane, empty of meaning and effect 
for all time.”7 As territorial sovereignty gave rise to legal national-
ism and positivism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the 
gap widened between the traditional Catholic understanding of 
the law of nations, grounded in the responsibility of rulers for the 
universal common good, and secularized international law, increas-
ingly grounded in sovereign autonomy and consent. 
Similarly, from the perspective of the classical natural law tra-
dition, the natural rights theories of Hobbes, Locke, and Rous-
seau shared a common reduction of the ends of human life and of 
politics. Understanding man as naturally solitary and antagonistic, 
they conceived of rights as emerging primarily from the instinct 
for physical self-preservation and need for security. At its core, this 
view diverged dramatically from the preexisting Catholic concep-
tion of rights as expressions of the human unity and dignity that 
flow from being created in the likeness of God.
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The contrast between the two traditions came to the fore con-
cretely with the French Revolution and the nineteenth century 
conflict between the Church and modern European liberalism. Al-
though it advanced various “Rights of Man,” the French Revolution 
also sharply attacked the authority of the Church, requiring priests 
to sign an oath of loyalty and taking the lives of many who refused.8 
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Revolution’s 
anticlericalism lived on in liberal republican movements in West-
ern Europe and Latin America, as well as in German Chancellor 
Otto von Bismarck’s Kulturkampf and in international socialism, all 
of which sought to truncate the Church’s rights, authority, and in-
fluence in civil society, especially in education. 
Fueling this conflict from the other direction was the Church’s 
own continued adherence to a theory of politics that it had de-
veloped in the Middle Ages, one holding that at least in countries 
where Catholics constitute a majority of the population, Catholi-
cism ought to be established as the religion of the realm while other 
faiths ought to be restricted. The Church’s doctrines thus forbade 
certain crucial aspects of liberalism, including religious freedom 
and freedom of expression.9 
For both of those reasons, in its struggle with modern European 
states throughout the nineteenth century, the Church’s teachings on 
natural rights were emphatically focused on the condemnation of 
what the Church saw as the false premises of liberalism. The prima-
ry target of criticism was the view of man as fundamentally autono-
mous, naturally free in an absolute sense that denied human beings’ 
structural dependence on God and their intrinsically social nature. 
This assertion of unqualified liberty, without regard to truth, was 
seen to result in excessive individualism, in the privatization and 
suppression of religion, and ultimately in the absolutism of the state 
subject to no higher authority. Consistently, the French Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and specific rights such as freedom of the press 
were condemned in magisterial pronouncements as manifestations 
of what Pius VI called the “monstrous right” of absolute liberty.10
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Only with the papacy of Leo XIII in the late nineteenth century 
do we see a greater convergence, or at least mutual engagement, 
between Catholic principles of human rights and the ideas common 
to secular political models. Like the other nineteenth century popes 
before him, Leo XIII taught that a notion of rights severed from the 
authority of God could confuse truth and falsehood and would ul-
timately place natural rights at the mercy of the changing whims of 
human legislators. Unlike his immediate predecessors, however, he 
went on to retrieve a different vocabulary of rights from within the 
tradition of the Church. Leo XIII affirmed in particular the right to 
marriage, the right to education, the right of association (especial-
ly associations of workers), the right to private property, and “the 
right of procuring the things which sustain life.” He dealt with the 
relationship of rights to the common good and of rights to duties, 
and other systematic, foundational questions of human rights.11 Leo 
XIII thus proposed a robust alternative to the liberal conception of 
rights by renewing and adapting the tradition to the new material 
conditions of mankind in the modern world. 
In the context of totalitarian dictatorship and world war in the 
1930s and 1940s, Popes Pius XI and Pius XII continued Leo’s af-
firmation of certain basic rights and stressed their grounding in the 
dignity of the person.12 By 1948, Catholic teachings on rights were 
well developed enough to exert an indirect but significant influence 
on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.13 
As with human rights, Leo XIII and his successors, especially 
Benedict XV, the “peace Pope” of the World War I years,14 as well as 
Pius XI and Pius XII, also opened the door to a greater acceptance 
of the realities of the modern state and states system. With respect 
to international law and institutions, Pius XII openly supported the 
work of the Dumbarton Oaks conference and the San Francisco 
conference that created the United Nations.15 Again, as with human 
rights, however, this endorsement was rooted in the Church’s long-
standing teachings about the universal common good, not in the 
idea of absolute, autonomous sovereignty.16
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By contrast, the Church’s judgment of democracy was far more 
uncertain. Prior to the twilight of the nineteenth century, popes 
spoke about democracy rarely and usually vitriolically, linking it to 
liberalism and socialism.17 Then, paralleling his development of the 
ideas of human rights and international society, Leo XIII began to 
discuss democracy more favorably, though still qualifiedly. Affirm-
ing that the Church is in principle neutral with respect to regime 
structure, he allowed that a majority might choose who will exer-
cise authority for the common good, but stressed, importantly, that 
“this choice decides who will be sovereign but does not confer the 
rights of sovereignty. The authority is not constituted [by the ma-
jority’s choice]; rather, it is decided who will exercise it.”18 In the 
mid–twentieth century, Pius XII endorsed democracy even more 
positively, but with similar reservations. In his 1944 Christmas 
message, he, too, abstained from sacralizing one particular form 
of regime, but condemned state absolutism, blaming it for the ag-
gression and corruption that engulfed the world in war, and spoke 
favorably of the strengthened spirit of democratic freedom and par-
ticipation that was to emerge after the war’s end. He even declared 
democratic government “a postulate of nature imposed by reason 
itself.” A contradiction to the claim that no one regime form is en-
duringly valid? Only when considered apart from his praise for “the 
democratic ideal of liberty and equality,” thus linking democracy to 
what popes have indeed taught is enduringly valid: human rights.19 
Like popes before and after him, though, he continued to insist that 
even democratic rule derives its authority from its orientation to 
the common good and that it can lose its authority insofar as it be-
comes “the arbitrariness of the mass.”
The same combination of commitments—support for inter-
national institutions, skepticism of absolute sovereignty, and human 
rights and democracy insofar as they instantiate the Church’s notion 
of the common good—redounded in the Church’s contemporane-
ous support for another, innovative form of institution: European 
federation, launched initially as the European Coal and Steel Com-
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munity with the Treaty of Paris in 1951. The founding fathers of 
the union were predominantly devout Catholics, including France’s 
Robert Schuman and (to a lesser extent) Jean Monnet,20 Italy’s Al-
cide de Gasperi, and Germany’s Konrad Adenauer; the  federation’s 
most supportive political parties were (mostly) Catholic-inspired 
Christian Democratic ones; and Pope Pius XII supported this 
founding enthusiastically. Precisely the political morality that we 
have been discussing explains this support. The nascent European 
federation represented a resurrection of the Church’s medieval 
vision of a morally and politically united European civilization, 
though now updated with modern notions of human rights and de-
mocracy. Through these institutions, shortly to become the Euro-
pean Economic Community and decades later the European Union, 
Westphalia was reversed. Over the course of its history, European 
integration consistently garnered its strongest support from Chris-
tian Democratic parties and disproportionately strong support 
from Catholic voters.21
In the following decade, Pope John XXIII continued and expand-
ed the Church’s commitments to human rights, democracy, and 
international institutions even while vigilantly stressing differences 
between Catholic and secular understandings of these ideals. In his 
1963 encyclical, Pacem in Terris,22 he praised the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights as “an act of the highest importance.” Drawing 
on the Catholic natural law tradition, he affirmed among the univer-
sal and inviolable rights of every person not only such rights as life, 
property, association, and education—rights recognizable by classic 
liberal theory—but also the right to follow one’s conscience in hon-
oring God, the right to work suited to one’s capacities, and the right 
to form and belong to intermediate groups in society. John departed 
even more strikingly from parallel, secular human rights ideas by 
identifying the true and ultimate aim of human rights to be the for-
mation of our relationship with God and our destiny in beatitude, as 
opposed to the illusion of an “autonomous self.” By contrast, he did 
not develop as clearly the Church’s teaching on democracy.
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For international bodies, especially the United Nations, John lent 
a stronger papal endorsement than any previous pope. In light of 
increasing interdependence and growing association among human 
communities, “no state can fittingly pursue its own interests in isola-
tion from the rest,” he averred. Observing that “the unity of the hu-
man family . . . consists of men who are all equal by virtue of their 
natural dignity,” he gave strong support to the creation and mainte-
nance of international structures with responsibility for the “univer-
sal common good; the good, that is, of the whole human family.” 
In the contemporaneous documents of Vatican II (1962–65) one 
can find a similar approach to human rights and modern political 
systems. The Council’s single most important departure from the 
Church’s earlier, medieval model of political authority was Digni-
tatis Humanae, which declared religious liberty a basic right rooted 
in the God-given dignity of the person—a right meant to protect 
both the practice of other faiths as well as the Church’s own rights 
in settings where it was threatened.23 
The Council’s Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Mod-
ern World, Gaudium et Spes, did not refer to “democracy” as such, 
but rejected despotic governments, affirmed the freedom of people 
to choose their type of government and their leaders, and appealed 
to the importance of political participation, which in turn it said 
required the rule of law and separation of powers.24 True to tradi-
tion, the document endorsed human rights far more strongly and 
explicitly. By that time, though, the political landscape of the world 
meant that to endorse human rights was effectively to endorse de-
mocracy since human rights were realized most effectively in states 
with democratic constitutions.25 Finally, Gaudium et Spes continued 
and extended the Catholic tradition of viewing the common good 
as worldwide in scope, and stressed repeatedly that international 
solidarity, coordination, institutions, and law are necessary to se-
cure peace, development, and human rights. 
In his own encyclicals, Paul VI embraced the call for inter-
national solidarity to secure justice and rights, extending it in a par-
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ticular way to questions of concern to the poorer regions of the 
world and to the problem of economic development.26 It is worth 
noting also that his encyclical on the eightieth anniversary of Leo 
XIII’s Rerum Novarum appeared to depart from the Church’s ear-
lier, formally neutral stance with respect to forms of government, 
and instead argued that “to counterbalance increasing technocracy, 
modern forms of democracy must be devised, not only making it 
possible for each man to become informed and to express himself, 
but also by involving him in a shared responsibility.”27
An even fuller integration of human rights, democracy, and 
international solidarity under the rule of law would take place in 
the extensive writings of Blessed John Paul II. He gave the idea of 
human rights an unprecedented breadth and centrality in Catholic 
social teaching, from his first encyclical, which expressed the hope 
that “human rights will become throughout the world a fundamen-
tal principle of work for man’s welfare,” to his last addresses.28 In his 
speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations on the occa-
sion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, for example, 
John Paul remarked that “there are indeed universal human rights, 
rooted in the nature of the person, rights which reflect the objective 
and inviolable demands of a universal moral law,” and he described 
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights as “one of the 
highest expressions of the human conscience of our time.”29 
And yet John Paul’s reflections on human rights also preserved 
and even heightened a tension that we have been tracing throughout 
this brief history. He criticized severely certain claims for rights 
that are grounded in radically different understandings of human 
anthropology. In Evangelium Vitae, for example, he decried modern 
culture’s tendency to characterize crimes against life as exercises 
of human rights.30 “How can we reconcile these declarations [of 
human rights] with the refusal to accept those who are weak and 
needy, or elderly, or those who have just been conceived?” he asked. 
“These attacks . . . represent a direct threat to the entire culture 
of human rights. It is a threat capable, in the end, of jeopardizing 
the catholic church, human rights, and democracy 25
the very meaning of democratic coexistence.” This contradiction is 
not new. Although John Paul is addressing a different set of social 
circumstances, his ambivalence toward human rights in the modern 
state arises out of the same understandings of the origin and ends 
of human life that have historically characterized Catholic thought 
on natural rights. 
In that same 1995 UN address in which he lauded the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, John Paul called for an equal atten-
tion to and respect for the “rights of nations” in the international 
order, “which are nothing but ‘human rights’ fostered at the specific 
level of community life,” but he takes great care to note that this 
does not necessarily entail state sovereignty for every people, nor 
does it limit the duties of international responsibility. Indeed, global 
solidarity and the universal common good were central themes in 
his social teachings.31
Whereas John Paul’s teachings on human rights and solidarity 
were notably forceful and pervasive, it was with respect to 
democracy that he broke a great deal of new ground. No longer 
invoking at all the traditional neutrality of the Church with respect 
to political systems, in his 1987 encyclical, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, he 
affirmatively and clearly called for democracy (in which he included 
by definition the rule of law and respect for human rights) as the 
best alternative to corruption and authoritarianism. Several years 
later, in his 1991 encyclical Centesimus Annus, John Paul II stated a 
preference for democratic systems forcefully: “The Church values 
the democratic system inasmuch as it ensures the participation of 
citizens in making political choices, guarantees to the governed 
the possibility both of electing and holding accountable those who 
govern them, and of replacing them through peaceful means when 
appropriate.”32 
It was not merely a formal or procedural view of democracy 
that John Paul endorsed. He spoke of “authentic” democracy as one 
that guarantees human rights, respects the rule of law, and ensures 
the common good. In particular, democracies must respect genuine 
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human values. “A democracy without values easily turns into open 
or thinly disguised totalitarianism,” he warned, noting that “even 
in countries with democratic forms of government, these rights 
are not always fully respected.” 33 The ultimate “synthesis of these 
rights” is religious freedom, “understood as the right to live in the 
truth of one’s faith and in conformity with one’s transcendent dig-
nity as a person.” Thus, he emphasized from the beginning of his 
pontificate that “religious freedom is simply one facet of the single 
prism of freedom, which is an essential constitutive element of an 
authentically modern and democratic society. This means that . . . 
a State cannot claim to be ‘democratic’ if it opposes religious free-
dom in any way whatsoever.”34
In sum, we can see in four centuries of Catholic thought on hu-
man rights, the rule of law, state sovereignty, and democracy both 
an essential continuity as well as profound doctrinal and philosophi-
cal developments, especially in the last century and most of all after 
Vatican II.35 We can see, too, both the convergence and the abiding 
tensions between Catholic thought and the norms that are found in 
domestic and international law and institutions. 
A concise synthesis of both themes and their application to two 
salient issues of global law and politics today can be found in Pope 
Benedict XVI’s address to the United Nations in April 2008.36 Bene-
dict first noted that the objectives of the United Nations represent an 
important part of the common good of the human family and reiter-
ates the Church’s call for a “greater degree of international ordering.” 
The basis for this endorsement, however, is clearly the universal re-
sponsibility for the common good. Citing Vitoria, Benedict affirmed 
the unity of the human family and derived from it a responsibility 
on the part of states to protect their own and others’ populations 
from grave violations of human rights and from humanitarian crises. 
The “responsibility to protect” is a controversial idea in international 
law and politics today, criticized for being at odds with the sover-
eign equality and autonomy of states or with a legalistic formalism 
that insists that nations may use military force only in self-defense 
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or with the UN Security Council’s prior authorization. Benedict’s 
clear affirmation of the legitimacy of the “responsibility to protect” 
is consistent with a tradition that sees the common good, rather than 
sovereignty, as the foundation of political authority. Such interven-
tion “should never be interpreted as an unwarranted imposition or a 
limitation on sovereignty,” he made clear.
His treatment of a second issue, human rights, revealed even 
more acutely the Catholic Church’s simultaneous convergence and 
persistent difference with prevailing secular conceptions and prac-
tices. Celebrating the sixtieth anniversary of the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights, Benedict affirmed that “human rights are 
increasingly being presented as the common language and the ethi-
cal substratum of international relations,” and he asserted that “the 
universality, indivisibility and interdependence of human rights all 
serve as guarantees safeguarding human dignity.” He quickly added, 
however, that the only genuine foundation for human rights is the 
natural law “inscribed on human hearts and present in different cul-
tures and civilizations,” and that human rights must be understood 
to be “measures of the common good.” The common good that 
rights help accomplish, he warned, will not be achieved through 
correct procedures or the formalities of legality, but requires that 
rights remain rooted in “unchanging justice” and “the unity of the 
human person,” rather than in positivistic or utilitarian conceptions 
of law and society. The most important guarantor that human rights 
are indeed oriented toward the integrity of the human person in 
all of its factors is the respect for religious freedom, “understood 
as the expression of a dimension that is at once individual and com-
munitarian—a vision that brings out the unity of the person while 
clearly distinguishing between the dimension of the citizen and that 
of the believer.”
Benedict concluded these reflections with a point drawn from 
his own encyclical, Spe Salvi, that “every generation has the task of 
engaging anew in the arduous search for the right way to order hu-
man affairs.”37 Church teachings in these areas are to be read and 
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practiced with attentiveness to concrete realities, through the ex-
ercise of prudence and practical reason, and cannot be considered 
merely as abstract doctrines. This brings us to the second portion 
of our article: a consideration of the Church’s practical experience 
of advancing norms of human rights and democracy once it had 
embraced them clearly in the latter twentieth century. 
II. Convergence and Conflict in Practice38
Here again, we find ambivalence. The Church’s convergence with 
liberal norms found in democratic states and international institu-
tions formed an efficacious synergy insofar as it enabled it to take 
up opposition to and to collaborate closely with other secular actors 
in opposing regimes that cruelly violated these norms: communist 
regimes, right-wing military dictatorships, and sui generis violators 
like South Africa’s apartheid regime. But the Church also encoun-
tered tensions in its advancement of these norms. Some of these 
arose in the Church’s confrontation with authoritarian regimes, in 
which some national churches were resistant to the new teaching or 
were too dominated by dictatorships to voice them. Other tensions 
surfaced in the Church’s relationship to democracies, both long-
standing and newly established ones, and to international institu-
tions like the European Union and the United Nations. These ema-
nated from differences like the ones described above between the 
Church’s interpretation of human rights and democracy, derived 
from its own conception of the common good, and interpretations 
articulated and practiced in the constitutions and policies of states 
and international institutions. 
The Church’s endorsement of human rights and democracy at 
Vatican II proved to be a powerful motor of change in the latter 
decades of the twentieth century. One of the most significant global 
trends of this period was what political scientist Samuel Hunting-
ton has called the “Third Wave” of democratization—a wave of 
some eighty countries that made a transition from authoritarian-
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ism to democracy.39 Observing the transitions between 1974 and 
1990, Huntington found that roughly three quarters of these were 
majority Catholic in their populations. The Third Wave was “over-
whelmingly a Catholic Wave,” he wrote. Beginning in Portugal and 
Spain in the 1970s, spreading across Latin America and the Philip-
pines in the 1980s, the Catholic Wave peaked in Poland in 1989, 
sparking the spate of Eastern European revolutions against com-
munist rule. After the end of the Cold War, the wave continued in 
settings like East Timor and Ukraine’s Orange Revolution of 2004. 
The Church’s new teachings were arguably an important cause 
of the Catholic Wave of democratization. They demonstrably led na-
tional Catholic churches, often in alliance with the Vatican, to defy 
communists and caudillos, a defiance that, combined with other 
factors, led to transitions to democracy. Leaders and laity protested 
publicly through statements and demonstrations; they organized in 
underground cells; they celebrated masses and other liturgies with 
a partly political intent; they joined forces with unions, parties, 
journalists, and non-governmental organizations within and out-
side of national borders; and they sometimes evoked the Church’s 
historical place in a country’s national identity so as to delegitimize 
regimes that oppressed it. 
Through such defiance, the Church’s convergence with the orga-
nizing principles of the modern liberal state became a potent force 
for justice. Yet, the transmission of Vatican teachings to national 
settings has not been universally smooth. Whereas some national 
churches opposed dictatorships inspiringly and memorably, others 
remained cozy with autocrats or stunted in their defiance. A brief 
global survey of the Catholic Wave reveals this variation.
In Europe, two forms of Catholic opposition corresponded 
to two different forms of dictatorship. In Portugal and Spain, the 
Church became a force for democracy by withdrawing its support 
for military dictatorships that it had helped to legitimize for sev-
eral decades, most vividly that of Spain’s Generalissimo Francisco 
Franco. Its authoritarian opponents in Eastern Europe were com-
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munist regimes that exercised dictatorial control over the gover-
nance and practice of churches. These regimes the Church opposed 
as a dissident, most memorably in Poland, where it was supported 
by its charismatic native son, John Paul. Church opposition was also 
strong in Lithuania, but was comparatively moderate in Czechoslo-
vakia and weak in Hungary. 
In Latin America, the Church had once been an integral partner 
to colonial states but eventually became disestablished in virtually 
every state on the continent in the nineteenth or early twentieth 
century.40 When most of Central and South America came (or per-
sisted) under the control of military dictatorships in the 1960s and 
1970s, some national Catholic churches became powerful voices of 
opposition and contributors to the wave of democratization that oc-
curred in the 1980s: in Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Gua-
temala, and in Mexico, where it was an anti-clerical leftist autoc-
racy that the Church faced. Other churches, however, in Argentina, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay, remained closely allied with dictatorships 
and did little to support these countries’ transitions to democracy 
in the 1980s. 
A similar pattern of opposition to a government with which the 
Church was once a partner occurred in the Philippines, where the 
Church helped to lead the “people power” protests that overthrew 
Ferdinand Marcos in 1986. Elsewhere in Asia, the Church was also a 
strong democratizer: in South Korea, it joined Protestant Churches 
in mounting public protests against the dictatorship of President 
Park Chung Hee; in East Timor, a Church that was once a partner 
to the colonial Portuguese state became, under the leadership of 
Bishop Carolos Ximenes Belo, a key leader in the struggle for inde-
pendence from Indonesia and the establishment of democracy. 
Finally, Africa also provides rich examples of both strong and 
weak democratizers among Catholic churches. In Malawi, for in-
stance, the 1992 national pastoral letter of that country’s bishops, 
“Living Our Faith,” leveled public criticism at the one-party dic-
tatorship of Hastings Banda and became pivotal in his downfall. 
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Catholic churches in Kenya, Congo, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Mozam-
bique, South Africa, and Zambia were likewise instrumental for 
democratization. In Uganda and Rwanda, by contrast, the Church 
was collaborationist or febrile; some Rwandan clerics were even 
implicated as perpetrators in the genocide of 1994.
What explains these differences? We propose two factors that 
enabled or hindered the Church’s advancement of its teachings of 
human rights and democracy and that account in good part for why 
the Church in Rome’s convergence with norm of human rights and 
democracy was strong in some locales but weak in others. 
The first may be thought of as “political theology,” the set of ideas 
that any religious person or organization holds about legitimate po-
litical authority. The strongest democratizers were those national 
churches in which the political theology of the Church’s teachings 
on human rights and democracy was held most widely and deep-
ly among all of its members, but especially its bishops. In some 
churches, such as in Chile and Brazil, these ideas had taken root and 
spread even prior to the Council and were then empowered by it. 
The second explanatory factor, coined “differentiation” by so-
ciologists of religion, describes the degree of mutual autonomy 
between churches and states in their basic legal authority. “Differ-
entiated” church-state relationships are ones in which churches are 
not established, remain unrestricted in their governance and prac-
tice, and do not themselves hold standing prerogatives in the state. 
By contrast, undifferentiated or “integrated” relationships are ones 
characterized by low autonomy in all of these dimensions. The most 
effective democratizers were churches acting from a high level of 
differentiation from the state, ones that neither collaborated close-
ly with nor were altogether suppressed by authoritarian regimes. 
Their differentiated position provided what George Weigel has 
called “moral extraterritoriality,” an island redoubt of free thought 
and speech from which it could speak and organize in opposition.41
Through four different sequential patterns, political theology 
and differentiation shaped national churches’ pursuit of democra-
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tization. The first consists of countries were the Church had been 
institutionally differentiated from the state for several decades pri-
or to Vatican II. At some later point, a liberal democratic politi-
cal theology characteristic of the Council rose and spread through 
its ranks and led it to become a democratizer. This pattern may be 
summarized as differentiation then ideas. Its best exemplar is the 
Polish Catholic Church, whose differentiation from the state dates 
back to its period of partition between 1795 and 1918 and per-
sisted through communist rule after World War II. Following the 
Council, the Polish Church became an advocate not just of its own 
autonomy but of the principles of human rights and democracy, 
themes that John Paul strongly resounded.42 The geographically 
proximate Lithuanian and Ukrainian Catholic Churches fit this pat-
tern as well, as does the South Korean Church. The same pattern 
obtains in Latin America, where virtually all national churches were 
disestablished—and institutionally differentiated—by 1925, many 
of whom hosted a growth in liberal democratic political theology 
at some later date, in all cases a growth that the Council greatly ac-
celerated. The most ardent proponents of democracy were those 
churches in which the new political theology became lodged earli-
est, widest, and deepest. It was the Brazilian church, where liberal 
democratic ideas were held widest, that took up democratic opposi-
tion earliest and strongest—lay movements, base communities, and 
a coalition (but not a unanimous one) of the nation’s bishops. Next 
came the Chilean Church, where the new thinking also took hold 
comparatively early, wide, and deep, and whose bishops, though 
initially divided over General Augusto Pinochet’s rule, were united 
against him by 1976. Churches in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Ecuador, 
Panama, Bolivia, and Guatemala became supporters of democracy 
later, once liberal democratic ideas gained ground there.43
In a second pattern, national churches remained undifferenti-
ated from their states right up to Vatican II, whose new thinking 
then brought them to separate themselves from their states. The 
sequence here was ideas then differentiation. By 1971, the bish-
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ops of the Spanish Church called for the separation of church and 
state, asked clergy to step down from government positions, and 
(in a majority vote) publicly repented for the Church’s role in the 
civil war of the 1930s. Their opposition proved a major source of 
democracy after the death of Franco in 1975. The democratization 
of Portugal just prior to that of Spain was also encouraged by a 
Catholic church where the Council’s political theology encouraged 
a majority of bishops to withdraw their support from an authoritar-
ian regime. In the Philippines, too, the Catholic Church that en-
couraged the overthrow of Marcos in 1986 under the leadership of 
Jaime Cardinal Sin was one that had once been integrated with the 
regime but then expanded its oppositional stance more and more 
strongly as its members took on the teachings of the Council more 
and more widely.44
A third pattern is one in which differentiation and new ideas 
arose in a national church at roughly the same time and where it is 
difficult to say how one influenced the other. It might be called ideas 
and differentiation. Many opposition movements in Africa during 
the 1980s and 1990s fit this description. Through episcopal pro-
nouncements, politically charged religious ceremony, organization 
and lobbying, the support of papal visits, and collaboration with 
Protestant churches and political parties, national churches in Ke-
nya, Congo, Ghana, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, South Af-
rica, and Zambia opposed postcolonial authoritarian regimes. In all 
of these cases, the Church’s agitation for democracy came after the 
rise of institutional differentiation and the reception of the Coun-
cil’s political theology of human rights and democracy.45
The fourth and final pattern involves those national churches that 
never or only feebly opposed dictatorships. True to the argument, 
these were far less autonomous from the state than the vigorous de-
mocratizers and contained far less support for liberal democratic po-
litical theology. The Czechoslovakian Catholic Church, which came 
to oppose its own communist regime only in the mid-1980s and 
much less energetically than did the Church in Poland and Lithu-
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ania, was also comparatively less independent in its governance, less 
connected with opposition groups, and, at least in the Czech por-
tion of the state, far more alienated from the loyalties of the na-
tion, which bore memories of Habsburg suppression of separatism 
during the Reformation era. Apart from the solitary opposition of 
József Cardinal Mindszenty, the Catholic Church in Hungary resist-
ed Communism even more feebly, and was even more dominated in 
its governance and slow to accept Vatican II’s teachings. In Africa, the 
churches that failed to pursue democracy strongly—those in Angola, 
Cameroon, Uganda under the Museveni regime in 1986, and Rwan-
da—failed to achieve differentiation, remaining either dominated, 
as was the Angolan Church under a Marxist regime, or strongly tied 
to the regime, as was the Church in Rwanda, and espoused a neutral 
political theology, open to supporting a wide variety of regimes.46 
These negative examples, too, point to the political factors that assist 
or hinder the Church’s promotion of its teachings on human rights 
and democracy, the fruit of the convergence with the modern state 
that took place progressively throughout the twentieth century.
In the years after Vatican II, the Church also manifested ambiva-
lence in its relations with existing constitutional democracies, the 
European Community/Union, and the United Nations. Its ambiv-
alence here was more straightforward, emanating from the con-
ceptual divergences with secularism described in the first part of 
our article. In broad principle, the Church continued to support 
strongly all of these institutions. After the revolutions of 1989, John 
Paul continued to voice support for democracy—and democracies. 
Though his support was global in its reach, above all he championed 
his native Poland, seeing in this overwhelmingly Catholic nation a 
potential model of a morally and spiritually well-grounded democ-
racy. He also continued the tradition of papal support for European 
federation, which took the form of the European Union in 1993. 
He hoped that common European institutions would be the carriers 
of a culturally united European civilization based on democracy, hu-
man rights, religious freedom, and the dignity of the person and the 
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family, the same vision that he had wielded against communist gov-
ernments in Eastern Europe.47 Finally, in numerous statements and 
speeches, John Paul continued the papacy’s support for the United 
Nations, both its traditional mission as well as new endeavors like 
humanitarian intervention.
But if John Paul, other postconciliar popes, and most national 
level bishops supported these forms of institutions and encouraged 
them to manifest the common good that the Church taught, they 
also at times found these institutions wanting in just this regard. 
The Church criticized democracies in North and South America, 
Europe, and Australasia most consistently and vociferously over 
policies regarding abortion, divorce, euthanasia, stem cell research, 
cloning, and same-sex unions. Though it often addressed itself to is-
sues like war, immigration, and the security of the poor as well, its 
statements, stratagems, and activism over the former set of issues 
most vividly manifested the divergence between its own conception 
of freedom, grounded in its teachings about the human person, and 
a secular liberal freedom of self-definition and subjective autonomy. 
Though this divergence played itself out in manifold political 
settings, it is hard to find a better showcase for it than in post- 
communist Poland. John Paul’s vision of Poland as a light for Eu-
rope, a similar vision held by Poland’s bishops—communist era 
Stefan Cardinal Wyszyn´ski had called Poland the “Christ of Nations” 
for its redemptive role in European history—combined with the 
prestige that the Church derived from its heroic opposition to com-
munist rule, gave the Church both an interest in and influence for 
promoting its conception of democracy on this particular turf.48 In 
the early years after the fall of communism, then, the Polish Church 
sought legal protection for the human person from the moment of 
conception and religious education in the public schools; a concor-
dat with the Vatican that guaranteed its right of internal governance 
and strong prerogatives in education, marriage, and civil society 
activities; and a constitution that explicitly referenced God and the 
Church’s role in the nation’s history, that established God’s “exist-
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ing and unchangeable law” as the basis of the state and superior to 
the constitution itself, that declared marriage to be between one 
man and one woman and that avoided the language of separation 
of church and state. But in this embryonic electoral democracy, 
the Church encountered competition from parties whose social vi-
sion was more reminiscent of the western half of the continent, 
the very region that the Church wanted Poland to influence and 
evangelize. Opposition was especially fierce from 1993 to 1997 
under the government of the Democratic Left Alliance (DLA), a 
party that included former communist leaders and that sought to 
liberalize abortion laws and opposed the terms of the concordat. In 
the end, the Church’s efforts were partially successful. The bishops 
were vexed that the final draft of the constitution did not contain 
the language about God, God’s law, or the protection of human 
life from the moment of conception that they had wanted. But the 
document did contain a traditional definition of marriage, language 
about the protection of life that the Constitutional Tribunal would 
later leverage in 1997 to overturn a liberalized abortion law passed 
by the DLA, several references to God, and an endorsement of the 
concordat, which, signed in 1993 between Poland and the Holy 
See, was itself quite favorable to the Church’s platform. Even in 
a state where the Church is uniquely influential, then, it clashed 
vigorously with partisans of a more secular conception of rights and 
democracy, though not without victories.
Similar lines of contention configured debates between the 
Church and the European Union in the early 2000s. Averring that 
the Union is a promoter not just of a free market and efficient busi-
ness transactions in a globalized world but also of a European cul-
tural unity that is ultimately rooted in Christianity, the Church pub-
licly took issue with the omission of Christianity in the preamble 
to the draft constitution of the European Union in 2003. Far from 
aiming to reestablish Catholicism as Europe’s religion, John Paul 
argued that Christianity merited mention on account of its historic 
contribution to democracy, human rights, religious freedom, the 
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secular state, pluralism, and, in his words, “a melting pot of dif-
ferent cultures” on the European continent.49 But Valéry Giscard 
d’Estaing, former president of France and chairman of the drafting 
committee for the EU Constitution, demurred, agreeing only to 
the preambular mention of Europe’s religious heritage alongside 
mentions of ancient Rome and Greece, the Enlightenment, and the 
French Revolution.50 The Church also expressed opposition to a 
trend toward endorsing same-sex unions in EU policies. The Eu-
ropean Parliament reciprocated when it rejected the nomination 
of Rocco Buttiglione, a Catholic Italian politician who adheres to 
the Church’s teachings on sexuality, as European Commissioner 
for Justice and Home Affairs. Perceiving this cultural momentum, 
some right-wing Polish Catholics even opposed democratic Po-
land’s entry into the European Union, fearing the body’s influence 
on Poland’s own politics. The consensus of Polish bishops, though, 
supported Poland’s entry, hoping that the influence would run in 
the other direction.
Finally, the Church has fought not a culture war, but certainly 
some cultural battles, against the United Nations. It fought these, 
again, on issues where the Church’s foundation for rights yielded 
different conclusions than those of secularists. 
At both the UN’s International Conference on Population and 
Development in Cairo in 1994 and its Fourth World Conference 
on Women in Beijing in 1995, the Church strongly affirmed the 
meetings’ basic goals of economic development and the equality of 
women but opposed abortion and artificial contraception as means 
of birth control as well as denials of the dignity of women’s voca-
tion to family and motherhood. As with disputes in the context of 
democratic states and the European Union, the Church took issue 
not with human rights and democracy themselves but with mani-
festations and interpretations that diverged from its own teachings.
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Conclusion
As Pope Benedict XVI’s December 2006 address to the Roman Cu-
ria suggests, the Catholic Church’s relationship to human rights and 
democracy has long been ambivalent. The Church endorsed human 
rights as early as its sixteenth century pronouncements on coloni-
zation in the New World and with accelerated force in its modern 
encyclicals beginning in 1891. Through an extended dialogue with 
the modern world, including proponents of the Enlightenment, 
and through the parallel evolution of the state and international in-
stitutions, the Church’s teaching converged more and more with 
the norms of human rights and democracies found in these secular 
institutions. This convergence was consolidated at Vatican II. But 
Vatican II did not dispel differences between Catholic and secular 
articulations of human rights and democracy, either in theory or in 
practice. In numerous (but far from all) instances, national Catholic 
churches have come to oppose dictatorships in the very name of hu-
man rights and democracy. In the case of long established or newly 
minted democracies, entirely new forms of divergence between the 
Church’s teachings and democratic practice have arisen. Such di-
vergence is likely to persist, even as the Church is likely to remain 
enthusiastic about the core norms of constitutional democracies, 
the European Union, and the United Nations.  
Though the Church’s teaching has evolved—or, better yet, “de-
veloped,” to use the concept that John Henry Newman articulated 
in the nineteenth century and that the Church embraced in the 
twentieth—there is nevertheless continuity and consistency behind 
the Church’s ambivalent stance toward human rights, democracy, 
and the modern state. The common thread running through cen-
turies of teaching and practice consists of the Church’s commit-
ment to upholding the transcendent dignity of the human person 
and affirming that the legitimacy of any political authority lies in its 
accountability to the common good, understood as a moral order 
grounded in this human dignity, rather than in state sovereignty or 
even democracy as such. 
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